An Overview of Automated Program Analysis

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CRIStAL's CyberSecurity Seminar 21 Oct. 2024



Introduction

Research Scientist at Inria since Sep. 2022.

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- ► Type systems for privacy

Target program

Target program ——— Program analyzer









Motivation

Sheer quantity of programs and changes during their life:

Manual processes (e.g. testing, manual verification) will not scale!

Target property φ

► Absence of runtime errors

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- ► Endianness portability [DOM21]

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 \implies now build **Analyzer**_{φ}(prog : *i*)

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- ► Real-world

Sound All errors in program reported by analyzer

All errors reported Complete by analyzer are replicable in program

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Guaranteed Termination

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Turing & Rice to the Rescue (or not?)



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Outline

1 Introduction

- 2 Overview of Program Analysis Techniques
 - Symbolic Execution
 - Fuzzing
 - Abstract Interpretation
- 3 Core Ideas behind Abstract Interpretation
- 4 A Modern Abstract Interpreter: Mopsa
- 5 Conclusion

Overview of Program Analysis Techniques

Symbolic Execution

Core idea: systematic generation of testcases
Explore all program paths

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Explore all program paths

► Collect path constraints

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► Collect path constraints

	Toy example
1	if x > 0:
2	return -x
3	else:
4	if y < 10:
5	return y
6	else:
7	raise Exception

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► Collect path constraints

▶ Rely on <u>constraint solvers</u> to generate testcases

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Further references

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- ► Symbolic execution survey [Bal+18]
- ► <u>Concrete</u> + symb<u>olic</u> = concolic execution [SMA05; GKS05]
- Constraint solvers are currently <u>SMT solvers</u>: Z3 [MB08], CVC5 [Bar+22], Alt-Ergo [Con+18], SMT-LIB interface [BFT16]

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Fuzzing

Core idea: throw random stuff at programs

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Various shades of fuzzing

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- ► White-box = symbolic execution

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- ► Google's OSS-FUZZ infrastructure

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- Suggested entry-point: Miné [Min17]

Core Ideas behind Abstract Interpretation





Interpret in non-standard domain Program proved safe



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False alarm (Abstraction too coarse)



Unsound analysis (shouldn't happen)

int x = rand();

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 - $\sigma^{\sharp} = x \mapsto [0, 2147483647]$

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Merging can also be applied to arrays, ...

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Precision can be recovered through <u>decreasing</u> <u>iterations</u> $\implies i = [0, 99]$

A Modern Abstract Interpreter: Mopsa





 Explore new designs Including multi-language support



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- ▶ Can be used as an experimentation platform

Contributors (2018-2024, chronological arrival order)

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- A. Ouadjaout
- 🕨 M. Journault
- A. Fromherz

- D. Delmas
- 🕨 R. Monat
- 🕨 G. Bau
- 🕨 F. Parolini

- ▶ M. Milanese
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Maintainers in bold.



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Multilanguage Analysis - Monat, Ouadjaout, and Miné [MOM21]

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Our approach: Combined analysis of C, Python and interface code

Library	C + Py. Loc	Tests	€ /test	# proved checks # checks	# checks
noise	1397	15/15	1.2s	99.7%	6690
cdistance	2345	28/ ₂₈	4.1s	98.0%	13716
llist	4515	167/ ₁₉₄	1.5s	98.8%	36255
ahocorasick	4877	46/92	1.2s	96.7%	6722
levenshtein	5798	17/17	5.3s	84.6%	4825
bitarray	5841	159/216	1.6s	94.9%	25566

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Coreutils - Ouadjaout and Miné [OM20]

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Benchmark	Time	Selectivity	# checks
basename	33.79s	98.65%	11,731
dirname	21.68s	99.61%	11,307
echo	19.26s	99.43%	11,010
false	14.50s	99.72%	10,774
pwd	22.04s	99.62%	11,502
rmdir	39.00s	99.22%	11,699
sleep	23.79s	99.46%	11,546
tee	35.69s	98.76%	12,057
timeout	32.28s	98.51%	12,420
true	9.55s	99.72%	10,774
uname	20.61s	99.52%	11,943
users	20.82s	99.06%	11,668
whoami	13.03s	99.66%	11,329

Non-exploitability – Parolini and Miné [PM24]

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 Relies on combination of taint+value analysis

Test suite	Domain	Analyzer	Alarms	Time
Coreutils	Coreutils Intervals		4,715	1:17:06
		MOPSA-NEXP	1,217 (-74.19%)	1:28:42 (+15.05%)
	Octagons	Mopsa	4,673	2:22:29
		MOPSA-NEXP	1,209 (-74.13%)	2:43:06 (+14.47%)
	Polyhedra	Mopsa	4,651	2:12:21
		MOPSA-NEXP	1,193 (-74.35%)	2:30:44 (+13.89%)
Juliet	Intervals	Mopsa	49,957	11:32:24
		MOPSA-NEXP	13,906 (-72.16%)	11:48:51 (+2.38%)
	Octagons	Mopsa	48,256	13:15:29
		MOPSA-NEXP	13,631 (-71.75%)	13:41:47 (+3.31%)
	Polyhedra	Mopsa	48,256	12:54:21
		MOPSA-NEXP	13,631 (-71.75%)	13:21:26 (+3.50%)

Scalability (compositional function analyses)

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Usability

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 - Handling of false alarms (ongoing work by Marco Milanese [MM24])
- Maintenance and development effort
- New languages, properties, specific programs



xkcd.com/303



Techniques

Symbolic execution

xkcd.com/303



Techniques

Symbolic execution

Fuzzing

xkcd.com/303


Techniques

- Symbolic execution
 - Fuzzing
- Abstract interpretation

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Techniques

- Symbolic execution
- Fuzzing
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Requirements

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Techniques

- Symbolic execution
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Requirements

Property to verify



Techniques

- Symbolic execution
- Fuzzing
- Abstract interpretation

Requirements

- Property to verify
- Semantics of language

22



Techniques

- Symbolic execution
 - Fuzzing
- Abstract interpretation

Requirements

- Property to verify
- Semantics of language
- Benchmarks; usecases

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