


Comparing Transparent Static Analyzers with Open Verification Dashboard

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Alarms

- ▶ Muske and Serebrenik [MS23]: 130 works on alarm postprocessing
- ▶ Alarms are only one side of the coin!

Transparency

- ▶ Log proof obligations (PO). Analogy with deductive verification.
- ▶ Enables semantics-directed, fine-grained output.

Comparing Static Analyzers

- ▶ Real-world software: no false/true alarm baseline
 - ▶ Incomparable approximations between analyzers
 - ▶ Transparency helps, yet harmonization efforts required
- `strcpy` misuse: buffer overflow or contract violation for the stub?

Dashboard Home Projects

```
1 int main_i;
2 void main() {
3     int a[0];
4     while (a[main_i])
5         main_i = main_i + 1;
6 }
7
```

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reduced/standard_find_ground-1.i

Invalid memory access: 4.9-4.18
Error Level: The two analyzers disagree on the error level of this conflict

GOBLINT	MOPSA
Warning 4.9-4.18 Invalid array access: May access out of bounds	Error 4.9-4.18 accessing 4 bytes at offset 0 of variable 'a:./dashboard/examples/reduced/standard_find_ground-1.i:3.2-10' of size 0 bytes

Integer overflow: 4.9-4.18
Only One Proof Obligation: Only the first analyser has a proof obligation for this conflict

GOBLINT	MOPSA
Safe 4.9-4.18 Cast: true	No checks for this range

- 1 Transparent Static Analysis
- 2 Open Verification Dashboard
- 3 Experimental Evaluation

Transparent Static Analysis

Safety check categories

Example on toy imperative language with mathematical integers

$$\mathcal{C} = \{\text{divByZero}\}$$

$$\mathcal{L}$$

$$\varphi \in \text{PO} = \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{C}$$

$$\Theta \subseteq \text{CH} = \text{PO} \times \{\checkmark, \times\}$$

Safety check categories

Program locations

Proof obligations

Checks

Concrete Collecting Semantics

$\mathbb{E}[e \in \text{Expr}] : (\text{Var} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}) \rightarrow 2^{\mathbb{Z}} \times 2^{\text{CH}}$ *Concrete semantics of e*

$\mathbb{E}[e_1 /^\ell e_2]\sigma =$

let $M_1, \Theta_1 = \mathbb{E}[e_1]\sigma$ and $M_2, \Theta_2 = \mathbb{E}[e_2]\sigma$ in

let $\Theta' = \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \text{check}(m_2 \neq 0) \mid m_2 \in M_2\}$ in

$\{m_1 / m_2 \mid m_i \in M_i, m_2 \neq 0, m_1 / m_2 \in \mathbb{Z}\}, \Theta_1 \cup \Theta_2 \cup \Theta'$

$\text{check}(b) = \text{if } b \text{ then } \checkmark \text{ else } \times$

$\mathbb{E}[1 /^\ell \text{rand}(-1, 1)]\emptyset = \{-1, 1\}, \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \checkmark\} \cup \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \times\}$

$\mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket e \in \text{Expr} \rrbracket : (\text{Var} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^\#) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^\# \times 2^{\text{CH}}$ *Abstract semantics of e*

$\mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket e_1 /^\ell e_2 \rrbracket \sigma^\# =$
let $z_1^\#, \Theta_1 = \mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket e_1 \rrbracket \sigma^\#$ and $z_2^\#, \Theta_2 = \mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket e_2 \rrbracket \sigma^\#$ in
let $\Theta' = \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \text{✗} \mid \mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket e_2 = 0 \rrbracket \sigma^\# \neq (\perp^\#, _)\}$ in
let $\Theta'' = \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \text{✓} \mid \mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket e_2 \neq 0 \rrbracket \sigma^\# \neq (\perp^\#, _)\}$ in
 $z_1^\# /^\# z_2^\#, \Theta_1 \cup \Theta_2 \cup \Theta' \cup \Theta''$

$\mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket 1 /^\ell \text{rand}(-1, 1) \rrbracket _ = [-1, 1], \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \text{✓}\} \cup \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \text{✗}\}$

$$\forall e \in \text{Expr}, \forall \sigma \in \gamma(\sigma^\#), \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mathbb{E}^\# \llbracket e \rrbracket \sigma^\# = (z^\#, \Theta^\#) \\ \wedge \mathbb{E} \llbracket e \rrbracket \sigma = (M, \Theta) \end{array} \right. \implies M \subseteq \gamma_{\mathbb{Z}}(z^\#) \wedge \Theta \subseteq \Theta^\#$$

$\Theta \subseteq \Theta^\#$ concisely encodes:

- ▶ If a check fails at runtime, the analysis should say so *true alarm*
- ▶ If a check is reachable at runtime, the analysis should check it *safe check*, *false alarm*

Report postprocessing

From analysis checks (same location, multiple contexts) to analysis results:


checkStatus : $2^{\{\checkmark, \times\}} \rightarrow \text{Status}$

$\emptyset \mapsto \ominus$

$\{\checkmark\} \mapsto \checkmark$

$\{\times\} \mapsto \times$

$\{\checkmark, \times\} \mapsto \omin�$



$\{(l, \text{divByZero}), \checkmark\} \cup \{(l, \text{divByZero}), \times\} \rightsquigarrow (l, \text{divByZero}), \omin�$

Open Verification Dashboard

Cross-Analyzer Comparison

Status ₁	Status ₂			
	!	×	✓	-
!	A ⁻	P	P	D
×	P	A ⁻	C	D
✓	P	C	A ⁺	D
-	D	D	D	A ⁺

- ▶ Positive or negative **agreement** (A⁺ / A⁻)
- ▶ Coverage **disagreement** (D)
- ▶ Precision **asymmetry** (P)
- ▶ **Contradiction** (C)

- ▶ JSON-based interchange format (simplified integration)
- ▶ CLI for automated workflows
- ▶ GUI interface for interactive exploration
 - Global statistics view (cf. paper)
 - Detailed view

Open Verification Dashboard GUI – Detailed view

Dashboard

Home Projects

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Integer overflow: [4.9-4.18](#)

Only One Proof Obligation: Only the first analyser has a proof obligation for this conflict

GOBLINT	MOPSA
Safe 4.9-4.18 Cast: true	No checks for this range

Integer overflow: [5.4-5.23](#)

Safety W2: Only the second analyser says that this is safe

GOBLINT	MOPSA
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Integrating a New Analyzer

Proof Obligation Outcomes

- ▶ Report successful checks in addition to alarms
- ▶ JSON interchange compatibility
- ▶ Check alignment

Standardized Integer Overflow Categories

Following a systematic comparison, 6 categories identified:

(signed|unsigned) integer overflow in (arithmetic operator|explicit cast|implicit cast)

Program Range Reporting

Multiple choices (line only, line+column, line+columns) in IKOS, Goblint, Mopsa

↪ Heuristic location alignment (details in paper)

Experimental Evaluation

Benchmarks

- ▶ SV-COMP no-overflow (8,358 tasks)
- ▶ coreutils `cut`, `env`, `uniq` \simeq 200kLOC



Transparent Tools

- ▶ Goblint
- ▶ Mopsa

Research Questions

- 1 Complementarity of Goblint and Mopsa?
- 2 Joint Benefit of Virtual Combination?
- 3 Distillation of Disagreements through Testcase Reduction?

SV-COMP Benchmark Validity?



N.B: Mopsa performs callstack-sensitive PO reporting.

RQ1: Complementarity

Mopsa	Goblint			
	!	×	✓	—
!	8122	0	2268	159
×	1	0	0	6
✓	222	0	11700	23754
—	949	0	1804	0

Table 1: **before** PO alignment fixes.

Mopsa	Goblint			
	!	×	✓	—
!	8123	0	2255	146
×	1	0	0	0
✓	222	0	32226	652
—	944	0	2126	0

Table 2: **after** PO alignment fixes.

- ▶ No contradictions
- ▶ Overall agreement
- ▶ Improved coverage consistency

Issue	Mopsa	Goblint
Missing check		#1933, cil#215, cil#216
Wrong location	#248	cil#211
Spurious check	#251	#1909, #1910, #1932

RQ2: Joint Benefit (Coreutils uniq)

	Goblint			
Mopsa	!	×	✓	−
!	16	0	3	0
×	0	0	0	0
✓	8	0	46	935
−	2	0	14	0

Joint Benefit

- ▶ Virtual combination improves precision
- ▶ But currently insufficient to prove whole program correct

Automated testcase reduction oracles

- ▶ Verdict-based: boolean output of SV-COMP verification
- ▶ Dashboard-based: specific safety check category

Folder	Task Metrics			Verdict-Based			Dashboard-Based	
	#	Lines	Conflicts	Final lines	Pres. (%)	Time (s)	Final lines	Time (s)
float-benchs	6	196.17	1.00	8.67	100.00	184.50	8.67	233.17
nla-digbench	4	42.25	5.75	5.00	0.00	104.25	6.00	123.00
termination-crafted	11	26.18	1.55	3.73	18.18	119.73	5.91	156.45
termination-crafted-lit	11	27.18	1.73	5.27	45.45	92.00	7.00	102.73
termination-numeric	3	30.00	1.00	4.00	0.00	124.00	5.67	190.00
termination-restricted-15	13	21.62	1.00	4.31	7.69	83.62	8.77	98.62

Dashboard Strategy

- ▶ Less aggressive in reducing size,
- ▶ 100% preservation of disagreements.

Conclusion

- ▶ Sound(i)ness [Liv+15]
- ▶ Textbook static analyses focus on computing reachable states [MS24; Min17]
- ▶ Exchanging results: SARIF [OAS20], SV-COMP's witnesses [Bey+16; Aya+24]

- ▶ Transparent analyses going beyond alarm-based reporting
- ▶ Enables fine-grained comparison, leveraged by Open Verification Dashboard
- ▶ 14 bugs improving precision & reporting quality of Goblint+Mopsa
- ▶ More details in the paper, available+reusable artefact
- ↪ standard for reporting C runtime errors detected by static analyzers.
- ↪ spreading transparent reporting? Helps with UX, comparisons & improvements.

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